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Boumediene v. Bush: The Court is Back 
 
by 
Jay Dratler, Jr. 
Goodyear Professor of Intellectual Property 
University of Akron School of Law 
 
Two years ago, I took a bold step.  Although a mere intellectual property professor, with 
no credible claim to expertise in constitutional or international law, I ventured to critique1 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.2  I justified my hubris by 
citing the case’s importance to constitutional law and human rights.3  If I, who had 
devoted 32 years to the study, practice and teaching of law generally (although not to 
those particular fields) couldn’t appreciate the decision, then how could the nation and 
the world?4 
  
My critique of Hamdan was more about style than substance.  I agreed, and still agree, 
with its result.  But I faulted the Court for three reasons.  First, the various splintered 
opinions were far too long.  All together, they exceeded the length of our entire 
Constitution by a factor of eight.5  Second, their reasoning was mind-numbingly technical 
and formalistic.  To the untrained reader, they had barely a hint of the grave and historic 
issues at stake: the balance between security and the rule of law on which great jurists 
have opined since the Magna Carta.6  Finally, in declining to address those issues 
directly, or even to put its technical discussion in their context, the Court had missed a 
“teachable moment” and had failed in its duty as a national educator.7  The overall effect 
of this judicial timidity, I argued, was a loss of judicial prestige and power and a 
weakening of the judicial branch.8 
 
                                              
1
 See Jay Dratler, Jr., A Brief Lament on Hamdan, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=913822 (last visited June 13, 2008) 
[hereinafter “Hamdan Critique”]. 
2
 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
3
  See Hamdan Critique at 1-2. 
4
  See also, id. at 5 (lamenting that judicial opinions were so complex and technical that the 
public and even the media must “must rely on commentators and intermediaries, as if the Justices 
were high priests of some obscure religion”). 
5
  See id. at 5 n.11 (reporting word counts for various Hamdan opinions and our Constitution). 
6
  See id. at 1-2, 5-6. 
7
  See id. at 3-4 (comparing Hamdan opinions unfavorably with Justice Kennedy’s rich and 
deliberate exploitation of the “teachable moment” in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 
(1989), the flag burning case). 
8
  See id. at 7-8. 
Well, I’m pleased to report that the Court is back.  In its decision in Boumediene v. Bush,9 
the Court not only reached the right result—that habeas corpus is a constitutional right 
extending to aliens held by the United States outside its territory when circumstances so 
justify.10  It also took the opportunity to teach the nation and the world about the glorious 
history of human rights in Anglo-American societies and to put the dispute in that 
context.  
 
The main issue in the case was the Constitution’s Suspension Clause.  Under its 
protection, the Great Writ of habeas corpus “shall not be suspended, unless when in 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”11  By a 5-4 majority, the 
Boumediene Court decided that the great Writ can apply to aliens outside the United 
States,12 and that the Court itself has a role in deciding under what circumstances.13 
                                              
9
 Boumediene v. Bush, ____ U.S. ____, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 4887 (June 12, 2008). 
10
  See id., 2008 U.S. LEXIS 4887 at *83 (“We hold that . . . . [i]f the privilege of habeas corpus 
is to be denied to the detainees now before us, Congress must act in accordance with the 
requirements of the Suspension Clause”); id. at 129 (“We hold that petitioners may invoke the 
fundamental procedural protections of habeas corpus”).  For discussion of the circumstances, see 
n.13 infra. 
11
  U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 9, cl.2. 
12
  See n.10 supra. 
13
  Under Boumediene, there are three levels of circumstances that a court must consider before 
granting a Great Writ under the Suspension Clause in the absence of congressional authorization.  
First, the court must consider whether the circumstances justify application of the Suspension 
Clause at all.  See Boumediene, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 4887 at  *52-84 (exhaustively reviewing 
precedent for aliens detained abroad).  The court must take into account “practical 
considerations,” including (if the petitioners are aliens detained abroad) whether the United 
States exercises de facto sovereignty, not just de jure sovereignty, over the place of their 
detention.  See id. at *52-74 (considering at length, and rejecting, government’s argument that it 
could avoid Suspension Clause’s application by disclaiming de jure sovereignty over 
Guantánamo);  id. at *56-72  (refusing to hold that Cuba’s bare de jure sovereignty over 
Guantánamo deprives courts of constitutional habeas jurisdiction, where treaty gave United 
States right to deprive Cuba of exercise of sovereignty indefinitely and United States in fact had 
exercised every practical incident of sovereignty). 
 Second, if the Suspension Clause applies, the court must consider whether the political 
branches have invoked it by recognizing an “invasion” or “rebellion.”  Finally, if the Suspension 
Clause applies and the political branches have not properly suspended the Writ, the courts must 
consider whether any alternative procedural protections that they have provided are adequate 
substitutes for those that would be available under the Writ.  See id. at *84 (“In light of this 
holding [that the Suspension Clause applies and was not invoked] the question becomes whether 
the statute stripping jurisdiction to issue the writ avoids the Suspension Clause mandate because 
Congress has provided adequate substitute procedures for habeas corpus”).  
 The Boumediene Court gave guidance only as to the first level of circumstances.  It 
pronounced a three-part test for “practical circumstances” permitting application of the 
Suspension Clause:  
 Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion.  He began where he ought, with the Magna 
Carta—the ultimate wellspring of the Anglo-American rule of law.14  He explained how 
the Great Writ had arisen as a means of enforcing the Magna Carta’s decree that (in his 
                                                                                                                                                  
“[W]e conclude that at least three factors are relevant in determining the reach 
of the Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the 
adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made; (2) 
the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and 
(3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the  
[*76] writ.” 
Id. at 75-76.  The Court made clear that the touchstone of the analysis is practical effect, not 
formalism.  See id., at *72 (“questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical 
concerns, not formalism”); id. at *76-84 (applying three factors to case at hand). 
 The Boumediene Court did not address the second level of circumstances because the 
government did not assert a formal suspension of the Writ.  See id. at *84.  As for the third level, 
the Court provided little precise guidance.  See id. at *96 (“We do not endeavor to offer a 
comprehensive summary of the requisites for an adequate substitute for habeas corpus”).  The 
court held “uncontroversial” requirements for judicial review of “the erroneous application or 
interpretation of relevant law” and the remedy of conditional release if imprisonment is found 
unlawful, but it also noted that “more may be required.”  Id. at *96-97 (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  It opined that the full procedural protection of a normal criminal trial 
would suffice.  See id. at 1-7 (“that the prisoners were detained pursuant to the most rigorous 
proceedings imaginable, a full criminal trial, would have been enough to render any habeas 
substitute acceptable per se”). 
 In the case at hand, the Court held the statute alleged to be a substitute inadequate 
primarily because it failed to provide for introducing evidence newly discovered between the 
military tribunal hearing and appeal.  See id. at *112-118.  Yet it also discussed a number of 
other possible deficiencies or requirements without characterizing their effect on adequacy, 
except perhaps in the aggregate.  See id. at *77-78, 104-105 (possible deficiencies: provision of 
“personal representative” who was not lawyer, practical limitations on evidence petitioner could 
introduce, admissibility of hearsay, and limitations of review on appeal); id. at *107-108 (same: 
practical risk of factual errors); id. at 109 (requirement: “some authority to assess the sufficiency 
of the Government’s evidence against the detainee”); id. at 111 (noting absence of explicit 
provision for remedy of release but finding it implied); id. at 112-113 (questioning appellate 
court’s ability to “make requisite findings of fact” and to  “review or correct the [tribunal’s] 
determinations, as opposed to merely certifying that the tribunal applied the correct standard of 
proof[,]” but abandoning discussion to consider question of newly discovered evidence).  See 
also, id. at *119-120 (expressing reluctance to read procedural protections of general habeas 
statute into alleged substitute, opining that they are not all necessary anyway, and concluding 
that petitioners had met their burden of proving inadequacy). 
 As a result, the Court appeared to leave the precise test for an adequate substitute to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis—a point the Chief Justice impliedly criticized in dissent.  
See id. at *163-164 (noting absence of clear objections to adequacy other than failure to permit 
introduction of newly discovered exculpatory evidence).   
14
  See Boumediene, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 4887 at *30-32. 
words) “no man would be imprisoned contrary to the law of the land.”15  From his first 
paragraphs, Justice Kennedy thus placed the issue and the case where they belong, on the 
bedrock of Anglo-American democracy.  He gave early notice that this was no ordinary 
case, but one for the ages—one involving the millennial struggles of free people to stay 
free. 
   
Justice Kennedy’s review of history made two important points.  First, it demonstrated 
that the Great Writ is and has been a vital bulwark against the abuse of executive power. 
It quoted Alexander Hamilton—a Founder best known for his advocacy of strong central 
government.  “[T]he practice of arbitrary imprisonments,” Hamilton wrote, “have been, 
in all ages, the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny.”16  The Court also 
recognized this fact in its reasoning: it based its decision to afford habeas corpus to 
Guantánamo’s prisoners in part on the separation of powers, which helps restrain 
executive abuse.17 
 
The second point of the majority’s review of history was that there is nothing new about 
the current tension between security and the rule of law.  It outlined the development of 
the Great Writ in the British Isles and in both British and American precedent applying 
it.18  As that review demonstrated, the Writ has often been controversial in times of stress.  
But only rarely in U.S. history has it been suspended.19  In a notable exception, President 
Lincoln suspended it during the Civil War—a paradigmatic “Rebellion” under the 
Suspension Clause.20 
 
Like a flower growing toward the sun, the Writ has become taller and stronger after bouts 
of darkness.  There is a reason for this steady growth.  As sober reflection in the later 
luxury of peace reveals, taking time to treat prisoners fairly is rarely so subversive of 
security as failing to do so is subversive of liberty and the rule of law.  We Americans 
learned that lesson painfully when we confessed our error in interning, during the heat of 
                                              
15
  Id. at *31. 
16
 The Federalist No. 84, C. Rossiter ed., at 512 (1961), quoted with approval in Boumediene, 
2008 U.S. LEXIS 4887 at *31. 
17
  See Boumediene, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 4887 at *35-40, 56, 72-74. 
18
   See id. at *41-52, 56-72. 
19
   See id. at *87 (citations omitted.): 
“Our case law does not contain extensive discussion of standards defining 
suspension of the writ or of circumstances under which suspension has 
occurred.  This simply confirms the care Congress has taken throughout our 
Nation’s history to preserve the writ and its function.  Indeed, most of the 
major legislative enactments pertaining to habeas corpus have acted not to 
contract the writ’s protection but to expand it or to hasten resolution of 
prisoners’ claims.” 
20
  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 563, 567 (2004) (Scalia and Stevens, JJ., dissenting) 
(noting that Lincoln’s unilateral suspension was later endorsed by Congress). 
World War II, tens of thousands of innocent citizens of Japanese descent without the 
slightest evidence of their disloyalty. 
 
The Court’s historical review also served another purpose.  It showed the lack of any 
precise precedent for today’s predicament.  As the majority put it: 
 
“Each side in the present matter argues that the very lack of a precedent 
on point supports its position. * * *” 
 
“Both arguments are premised, however, upon the assumption that the 
historical record is complete and that the common law, if properly 
understood, yields a definite answer to the questions before us.  There 
are reasons to doubt both assumptions.  Recent scholarship points to the 
inherent shortcomings in the historical record. . . .   And given the unique 
status of Guantánamo Bay and the particular dangers of terrorism in the 
modern age, the common-law courts [*52] simply may not have 
confronted cases with close parallels to this one. We decline, therefore, 
to infer too much, one way or the other, from the lack of historical 
evidence on point.”21 
  
That point should be obvious to anyone who has followed the news for the nearly seven 
years since 9/11.  Our enemy—Al Qaeda—is a non-state actor, responsible to no head of 
state and to no people, including its own members.  Yet it has formally declared war on 
us, in a purported fatwa of February 1998.  That declaration encompasses civilians, 
pronouncing a duty of all Muslims to “kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and 
military—. . . . in any country in which it is possible to do it[.]”22  After successfully 
attacking several of our installations abroad, Al Qaeda managed to do what no enemy 
since the British has ever done: successfully attack our major commercial city and the 
citadel or our military command, killing nearly 3,000 innocent civilians.  It was as if 
Pancho Villa had declared war on our civilians and then had managed to sack New York 
and Washington, D.C. 
 
It goes without saying that we have never been in this spot before.  So precedent from 
earlier wars is of limited value. 
  
                                              
21
 Boumediene, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 4887 at *51-52. 
22
  World Islamic Front Statement, Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders (Feb. 23, 1998), available 
in English translation at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm (visited June 
13, 2008).  The statement is a “purported” fatwa because its authors had no evident officially 
recognized religious authority to issue it. 
The dissenters failed to recognized this point.  The heart of their legal argument was their 
interpretation of a single precedent, Johnson v. Eisentrager.23  In their view, that case 
established a bright-line rule depriving aliens held outside United States’ territory of the 
Great Writ.24 
                                              
23
 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).  See Boumediene, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 4887 at 
*134-135 (Roberts, C.J., agreeing with Justice Scalia’s dissent on this point); id., at *189-203 
(analyzing Eisentrager and precedents construing it and concluding, at *202, that “[t]here is 
simply no support for the Court’s assertion that constitutional rights extend to aliens held outside 
U.S. sovereign territory”). 
 Apart from policy, the dissenters attacked the majority’s analysis for several other 
reasons.  They asserted that: (1) the majority erroneously applied general principles of 
“separation of powers,” rather than the specific prohibitions on the exercise of power that the 
Constitution explicitly states, see id. at *185-189 (Scalia, J.); (2) any Suspension-Clause 
challenge to the relevant statute was premature because the petitioners had not exhausted their 
appeal rights under the statute, see id. at *137-154 (Roberts, C.J.); (3) the majority construed the 
statute too narrowly in concluding that it denied important procedural rights,  see id. at *146-163, 
173-176  (Roberts, C.J.) (4) the statute contemplates satisfactory substitutes for introducing 
newly discovered evidence, and a facial challenge based on the contrary view is inappropriate, 
see id. at *163-169 (Roberts, C.J.); (5) the majority’s imprecise standards would encourage 
litigation that would cause delay and impair the national security, see id. at *176 (Roberts, C.J.) 
and (5) the majority asserted “an inflated notion of judicial supremacy,” see id. at *203-205 
(Scalia, J.). Since all dissenters wrote or joined both dissents, it is appropriate to consider both 
together.  See n.24 infra. 
24
 This point was the heart of both dissents.  That bright line rule, in the dissenters’ view, creates 
a judicial power vacuum, giving the executive unchallenged power to manage foreign affairs 
involving aliens abroad, such as those at Guantánamo, without interference from the courts. 
 
Justice Scalia best revealed this position in a sarcastic assertion that the majority’s rule would do 
much the same thing, albeit less universally and less clearly.  See id. at 204-205 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting): 
“[S]o long as there are some places to which habeas does not run—so long  
[*205] as the Court’s new ‘functional’ test will not be satisfied in every case—
then there will be circumstances in which ‘it would be possible for the political 
branches to govern without legal constraint.’  Or, to put it more impartially, 
areas in which the legal determinations of the other branches will be (shudder!) 
supreme.  In other words, judicial supremacy is not really assured by the 
constitutional rule that the Court creates.  The gap between rationale and rule 
leads me to conclude that the Court’s ultimate, unexpressed goal is to preserve 
the power to review the confinement of enemy prisoners held by the Executive 
anywhere in the world.” 
 
In this passage, Justice Scalia appears to assert that, with respect to aliens held abroad, either the 
executive or the courts must be emperor—that power cannot be shared. 
 
 But we who teach the law take pains to instruct students that precedential decisions are 
not statutes.  Even when rendered by our highest court, they do not stand for simply-
stated abstract propositions.  Seldom do they pronounce bright-line rules, least of all in 
complex and historically fraught fields like habeas corpus.  Instead, they govern only 
insofar as their facts justify.  
 
There are so many important factual differences between Eisentrager and Guantánamo 
that it is difficult to know where to begin.  The facts underlying Eisentrager occurred in 
the aftermath of the greatest war in human history.  Estimates suggest that fifty million or 
more people died in that war; American fatalities alone were about half a million.25  
Sacrifice and suffering had been universal, and Americans had not escaped.  Even those 
at home had suffered shortages and rationing of gasoline, tires, and foodstuffs, inter alia: 
they had made do with their own personal “Victory Gardens.” In order not to cast doubt 
upon their patriotism or loyalty, many citizens of Japanese descent had suffered the 
Internment without question or complaint. 
 
The prisoners seeking habeas corpus in Eisentrager were admitted German nationals.26  
They had been arrested for conspiring with the Japanese enemy in China after their 
government had surrendered unconditionally and before the Allies’ victory over Japan.27  
As the Eisentrager Court noted, the dictates of both sovereignty and the concept of “total 
war” which then had devastated large parts of the world expected citizens of enemy 
nations—and sometimes compelled them—to partake in hostilities against the Allies 
whether they wanted to or not.28  In this sort of “total war,” a national of an enemy nation 
was presumed to be an enemy, and that presumption was an explicit part of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia joined each other’s dissents, and the two remaining 
dissenting justices, Thomas and Alito, joined both.  See id. at *133-134, 177.  See also, id. at * 
135 (Roberts, C.J.: although finding issue of detainees’ entitlement to habeas a “difficult one,” 
stating that “I nonetheless agree with Justice Scalia’s analysis of our precedents and the pertinent 
history of the writ, and accordingly join his dissent”).  The other five justices joined or wrote the 
majority opinion, and Justice Souter, Joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, wrote a separate 
concurrence emphasizing the long delay in providing justice that had already occurred.  See id. at 
*133 (Souter, J., concurring: “After six years of sustained executive detentions in Guantanamo, 
subject to habeas jurisdiction but without any actual habeas scrutiny, today’s decision is no 
judicial victory, but an act of perseverance in trying to make habeas review, and the obligation of 
the courts to provide it, mean something of value both to prisoners and to the Nation”). 
25
 See http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/timeline/statistics.htm (last visited June 13, 
2008). 
26
  See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 765; id. at 784 (“the petition of these prisoners admits . . . that 
they are really alien enemies”). 
27
  See id., 339 U.S. at 765-766. 
28
  See id. at 772-773.  
Eisentrager Court’s reasoning.29  Under these circumstances of total, worldwide war—in 
which nationals of enemies are presumed enemies30—plus universal suffering and 
sacrifice, it is not hard to see how the Court might deny our constitutional protection to 
admitted enemy nationals arrested abroad. 
 
The situation at Guantánamo could hardly be more different.  The prisoners there are 
stateless persons31 or nationals of nations like Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, all of which are friendly with the United States.  The Eisentrager Court’s 
presumption of enmity arising from nationality in a enemy nation during a conventional 
war simply doesn’t apply to them. 
 
                                              
29
  See esp. id. at 772, citing Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 438, 480, 1818 N.Y. 
LEXIS 151 (1891), and The Rapid, 8 Cranch (12 U.S.) 155, 161, 3 L.Ed. 520 (1814) (other 
citations omitted; emphasis added): 
“Chancellor Kent, after considering the leading authorities of his time, 
declared the law to be that ‘. . . in war, the subjects of each country were 
enemies to each other, and bound to regard and treat each other as such.’ . . . If 
this was ever something of a fiction, it is one validated by the actualities of 
modern total warfare.  Conscription, compulsory service and measures to 
mobilize every human and material resource and to utilize nationals—
wherever they may be—in arms, intrigue and sabotage, attest the prophetic 
realism of what once may have seemed a doctrinaire and artificial principle. 
With confirmation of recent history, we may reiterate this Court’s earlier 
teaching that in war ‘every individual of the one nation must acknowledge 
every individual of the other nation as his own enemy—because the enemy of 
his country.”” 
This point is hardly dictum or an offhand remark.  The entire first section of the Court’s 
opinion—some ten pages in the U.S. Reports—expands on this principle, its derivation and its 
corollaries.  See id. at 768-777. 
30
  See n. 29 supra. 
 In this regard the Eisentrager opinion contains an interesting logical flaw.  At the time of 
the German prisoners’ allegedly inimical activities, Nazi Germany had surrendered 
unconditionally to the Allies.  Therefore, technically speaking, they were no longer nationals of 
an enemy nation. 
 The Court addresses this point only  indirectly, later referring to “the present twilight 
between war and peace[,]” id. at 779, and noting (in discussing issues other than habeas) that 
“[t]he jurisdiction of military authorities, during or following hostilities, to punish those guilty of 
offenses against the laws of war is long-established.”  Id. at 786 (emphasis added).  The 
implication is that the Eisentrager prisoners’ status as enemies solely by virtue of being nationals 
of an enemy nation carried over into the post-surrender period. 
31
  Osama bin Laden himself is probably also a stateless person.  His Saudi passport was revoked 
in 1994, and Sudan expelled him.  See Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower 195, 221-223 
(Alfred A. Knopf  2006).  He chose Afghanistan for residence precisely because it was in chaos.  
See id. at 222-223.  After 2001, no nation was or is eager to grant him citizenship. 
More important, the radically new concept of war wrought by Al Qaeda totally 
undermines the conceptual basis of Eisentrager.  Al Qaeda is a non-state, transnational 
organization, with “members” or affiliates in a number of different nations, nearly all of 
which are friendly to the United States.  In determining who are its “members” or 
supporters, nationality, citizenship, passport, language, dress and ethnicity mean little or 
nothing.  To assess “membership” in or complicity with Al Qaeda, you must analyze a 
suspect’s actions or look into his heart. 
 
And that is precisely the point.  Some Guantánamo prisoners claimed they were utterly 
innocent, i.e., that they had no relationship with or sympathy for Al Qaeda and had taken 
no hostile action against the United States.  They were, they claimed, victims of mistaken 
identity, false evidence provided by personal, political or tribal enemies, or simply being 
in the wrong place at the wrong time.  To the extent these claims are factually correct, 
none of the rationale of Eisentrager, whether based on presumably inimical nationality or 
hostile acts, applies to them. 
 
The prisoners’ factual claims of innocence are an essential threshold question that the 
dissenters in Boumediene would ignore.  Yet they are classic human pleas for justice that 
deserve to be heard.  An innocent man is not an “enemy combatant.” 
 
Imprisonment or punishment based on mistaken identity or false witness is the nightmare 
of every free society.  It is one reason why the Great Writ has survived and grown in 
stature over the eight centuries since Magna Carta.  Every human being who claims to 
have been caught in a false web desires—and deserves—to have those claims heard by a 
neutral judge as far removed as possible, in authority and mindset, from the persons and 
institutions that imprisoned him.  
 
For these claims of innocence, a military tribunal is not good enough.  Although 
ostensibly neutral, military judges are in the chain of command, and the command may 
have many reasons, unrelated to justice, for continuing to hold an innocent person.  
Among them are: avoiding an appearance of weakness or incompetence, covering up 
mistakes, indulging unjustified hopes of extracting useful intelligence, putting pressure 
on other inmates to provide intelligence, and seeking to minimize logistical expense and 
trouble for such things as transport and repatriation.  None of these points is justification 
for holding an innocent person, but all can influence the military’s decision whether or 
not to release him.32  Equally important, all can create an appearance of bias, 
                                              
32
  From a practical standpoint, the most persuasive of these points are those relating to 
intelligence.  Yet an innocent person is unlikely to have useful intelligence.  Any that he has he is 
likely to divulge voluntarily, and relatively quickly (if indeed he is innocent).  To the extent he 
does have important intelligence, that fact alone may tend to disprove his innocence; and a 
habeas court could consider its general nature or (in secret) its details in assessing his claims to 
innocence.  Holding an innocent person who has voluntarily divulged all he appears to know 
undermining the United States’ reputation for fairness and the rule of law and subverting 
our effort to win Muslims’ hearts and minds.33 
 
The situation is different when a prisoner has admitted an affiliation with or sympathy for 
Al Qaeda or hostile action against the United States, as did Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, 
the mastermind of 9/11.  In that case, the conceptual basis of Eisentrager is satisfied a 
fortiori.  Eisentrager presumed that enemy nationality means enmity and derived that 
presumption in part from the notion that enemy nations might compel cooperation.  But 
where a suspect admits sympathy to or complicity with—let alone actual assistance to—a 
hostile agency, no compulsion is necessary. Therefore no presumption is needed to justify 
the conclusion of enmity that underlay Eisentrager. 
 
Logistical and institutional concerns also underlay Eisentrager.  Chief among these were 
the expense and disruption of transporting prisoners and witnesses from foreign venues 
for trial during wartime and the fear that judicial second-guessing would disrupt the 
military chain of command and undermine the prestige of the U.S. military and respect 
for its authority.34 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
solely for the purpose of putting later-acquired pieces of intelligence together or of coercing 
others to speak is not something that a just and free society should countenance.  Nor is 
continuing to hold an innocent person because his interrogators, through incompetent 
questioning, allowed him to gain some inkling of the sources of their concern. 
33
  In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts cited hostile acts of some 30 Guantánamo prisoners, after 
their release by the executive, as reason to defer to the executive in determining whom to release.  
See Boumediene, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 4887 at *179-181 (Roberts, C.J.).  This logic is a non-
sequitur for two reasons.  First, the executive itself released these hostile prisoners, without 
habeas corpus.  Apparently Roberts believes the release was a mistake, but he provides no 
reason to suspect, let alone believe, that habeas courts would do any worse.  Conscious of the 
practical risks of erroneous release of prisoners and of their relative institutional incompetence, 
habeas courts might well require stronger evidence of innocence than either the executive or the 
military. Cf. Boumediene, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 4887 at *126 (“We recognize . . . that the 
Government has a legitimate interest in protecting sources and methods of intelligence gathering; 
and we expect that the District Court will use its discretion to accommodate this interest to the 
greatest extent possible”).  They would, however, have a crucial advantage from the perspective 
of justice and human rights: they would be neutral and therefore not swayed by various practical 
ulterior motives that might influence military tribunals.  See the text at n.32 supra.  
 Second, Roberts neglects the effect of imprisonment itself on the prisoners’ state of mind.  
I am a scholar and intellectual, not a violent man.  But if I felt I had been imprisoned for six 
years without cause during the flower of my youth I might well take up arms against the power 
the imprisoned me.  At the very least, I would write inimical tracts.  Roberts neglects the very 
real risk that innocent people, imprisoned by mistake or through false evidence, might become 
radicalized or radicalize others. 
34
 See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 778-779. 
Here again the vastly different situations in Eisentrager and at Guantánamo provide a 
solid basis for distinction.  World War II was the greatest military conflagration in world 
history.  Even after it ended, millions of soldiers had to be demobilized, millions of 
POWs repatriated, and millions of refugees relocated.  The War and its aftermath 
probably involved the greatest involuntary mass migration in human history.  Justice 
Jackson, who presided at the Nuremburg war crimes trials and wrote the unanimous 
opinion in Eisentrager, was aware of the immense human scale of the war and its 
aftermath. 
 
In contrast, Guantánamo involves nothing of the kind.  At is fullest, it held about 750 
prisoners35—a drop in the bucket of World War II’s mass displacement. 
 
As for the so-called “war on terror,” it is not even really a war.  Except perhaps in Iraq 
(whose relationship to the struggle with terrorism is controversial and disputed), the 
battle against terrorism is a matter of covert intelligence and police activities, limited 
special operations, and counterinsurgency.  Most of these activities are limited in scope, 
secret, and far removed geographically from imprisonment and interrogation of suspects 
at places like Guantánamo.  The dangers of disrupting the military chain of command are 
greatly reduced once a suspect has been removed from temporary battlefield custody and 
transferred to a permanent prison far from the conflict for holding and interrogation.  The 
risk of impairing respect for military command and operations is minimal because the 
chain of command and the relevant operations are mostly secret—or at least unknown to 
the public and the enemy.  Habeas proceedings also can be made secret in whole or in 
part as necessary.  And the expense and trouble of transporting prisoners from places like 
China and Germany is far greater than transporting them from 90 miles off the Florida 
coast. 
 
Like Eisentrager’s presumption of enmity from nationality, its logistical and institutional 
concerns have no application, or are greatly attenuated, in the context of Guantánamo.  
Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex. 
 
The dissenters in Boumediene considered none of this.  To justify their bright-line rule 
that aliens abroad have no habeas rights, they took statements from Eisentrager out of 
context and gave them decisive weight.  The ignored the thrust of Eisentrager’s analysis: 
that “enemy aliens, resident, captured and imprisoned abroad” have no right to habeas.36  
For prisoners who claim they are not enemies but were falsely identified or accused, a 
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 See BBC News (online), “Profile: Guantánamo Bay” (Oct. 26, 2006), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4720962.stm (last visited June 14, 2008) (“By November 
2002, the camp [at Guantánamo] held more than 750 detainees.  Since then, hundreds have been 
either freed or handed over to their national governments”). 
36
 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777 (emphasis added).  See also id. at 779 (“we could expect no 
reciprocity for placing the litigation weapon in unrestrained enemy hands”). 
central precondition of Eisentrager is not met, because the Eisentrager presumption is 
inapplicable unless and until their factual claims are proved false.  
 
There is one more important distinction between Eisentrager and Guantánamo which no 
justice in Boumediene mentioned. In Eisentrager self-evident wartime and practical 
needs justified the prisoners’ places of initial detention, trial and final detention.  They 
were apprehended in postwar China for acts allegedly committed there.  They were tried 
in China under a pre-existing U.S. military command structure with pre-existing 
procedures.  Upon conviction by military courts, they were transferred to a pre-existing 
military prison in Germany for incarceration and eventual repatriation.37  The place of 
initial apprehension and trial had obvious practical justifications.  The transfer to 
Germany no doubt reflected the chaos of postwar China.  It also provided more humane 
treatment than continued incarceration in postwar China would have, and it facilitated the 
prisoners’ eventual repatriation. 
 
Guantánamo is as different as night from day.  The facility at Guantánamo used for the 
Boumediene prisoners was no pre-existing prison, and the procedures used to decide the 
crucial factual questions no pre-existing product of wartime exigency.  Both were 
specially designed and constructed, at considerable expense and under considerable legal 
and political controversy, for the very class of prisoners of whom the Boumediene 
petitioners were representative. 
 
Furthermore, publicly available evidence now suggests that the primary reason and 
motivation for building the new prison facilities and creating the new procedures had 
nothing to do with wartime or practical exigencies but everything to do with legal 
exigencies perceived by the Executive.  The executive appears to have built a brand new 
prison at Guantánamo in order to create a “Constitution-free” zone in which it could 
interrogate and handle the prisoners without any checks or balances.  It appeared to want 
no judicial interference, whether in its interrogation or in determining whether the 
prisoners were indeed “enemy combatants” subject to interrogation at all.  It did not 
provide any special procedures until judicial decisions forced it to do so, apparently 
preferring to hold the prisoners indefinitely without trial.38  In other words, the executive 
built its prison and its special procedures to circumvent our Constitution and our laws.  
This is exactly the sort of arbitrary detention that habeas was meant to control. 
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 See id. at 765-766. 
38
  See Boumediene, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 4887 at *74 (government’s argument that lack of 
sovereignty divests habeas jurisdiction over aliens implies “that by surrendering formal 
sovereignty over any unincorporated territory to a third party, while at the same time entering 
into a lease that grants total control over the territory back to the United States, it would be 
possible for the political branches to govern without legal constraint”); id. at *73 (“Our basic 
charter cannot be contracted away like this”). 
For purposes of this essay, it doesn’t matter whether these charges are all correct.  It is 
enough that there is substantial evidence to support them, which there is.  For the Court to 
ignore that evidence would be to encourage the executive to manipulate facts on the 
ground for the primary or sole purpose of depriving the Court of habeas jurisdiction, 
which not even Congress can do.  Tolerating that ploy would amount to wholesale 
abdication of the Court’s power and responsibility. 
 
No doubt that is what the Boumediene majority had in mind when it referred repeatedly 
to the separation of powers39 and to the Court’s authority and responsibility to decide 
“what the law is.”40  If the executive could defeat the Great Writ and the Court’s 
authority by the simple expedient of building a new prison in a legally unique territory 
and decreeing its own arbitrary procedures by regulation, then the separation of powers 
and the Great Writ that helps enforce it would mean nothing. 
  
The dissenters appeared to tolerate and encourage—even to desire—this result.  They 
relied on the foreign character of both the prisoners and the prison, ignoring 
Eisentrager’s emphasis on their enmity and apparently viewing the Executive’s power 
over foreign affairs as absolute.  They saw handling of aliens abroad as quintessentially a 
foreign issue, and therefore under the executive’s exclusive control, whether or not the 
aliens are friendly and erroneously accused. 
 
Besides its logic, there is a practical problem with this view.  Mistreatment of foreigners 
is not without consequence, including domestic consequence.  Denying innocent 
foreigners from friendly countries a chance to prove their innocence in an atmosphere 
untainted by military necessity or potential bias may come back to bite our citizens both 
at home and abroad.  We have seen this phenomenon repeatedly. It appears in the 
recruiting boost that the War in Iraq has given Al Qaeda.  It appears it in the opposition, 
disdain and occasional enmity that our executive’s unilateralism has evoked, even among 
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  See id. at *74 (“the writ of habeas corpus is itself an indispensable mechanism for monitoring 
the separation of powers. The test for determining the scope of this provision must not be subject 
to manipulation by those whose power it is designed to restrain”); id. at 127: 
“Security depends upon a sophisticated intelligence apparatus and the ability of 
our Armed Forces to act and to interdict.  There are further considerations, 
however.  Security subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom’s first principles.  Chief 
among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal 
liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers.  It is from 
these principles that the judicial authority to consider petitions for habeas 
corpus relief derives.” 
40
  Id. at *74 (“To hold the political branches have the power to switch the Constitution on or off 
at will [by manipulating location or sovereignty] . . . would permit a striking anomaly in our 
tripartite system of government, leading to a regime in which Congress and the President, not 
this Court, say ‘what the law is’”), quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
our erstwhile allies.  In some future conflict we may yet see it in the retaliatory torture 
that John McCain so rightly fears. 
 
In a flat, globalized world, it is folly to suppose that we can draw a sharp line between 
foreign and domestic affairs.  How we handle ourselves abroad—especially with friendly 
parties—has a direct effect on how others treat us both at home and abroad, 
economically, socially, and militarily.  To hold that our courts can have no say over acts 
abroad, even those involving innocent nationals of friendly countries, and even though 
they may ultimately have profound effects on citizens at home, is to abdicate judicial 
power to guard the rule of law. 
 
These were not the dissenters’ only errors.  Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia 
unwittingly revealed their penchant for judicial activism.  Justice Scalia devoted the 
whole first section of his dissenting opinion to reaffirming and praising the balance 
between security and civil rights that the executive had struck.41  He spent literally pages 
describing the dangers that Al Qaeda poses and the need for the executive to confront it 
unhindered by judges whose expertise lies elsewhere.42  Chief Justice Roberts did much 
the same.  He went so far as to recount the hostile activities in which former Guantánamo 
prisoners had engaged after being released by the executive on its own accord, without 
judicial intervention.43 
 
These points are self-evidently matters of policy, beyond the scope of judicial review.  It 
is not the courts’ job to address them, whether to affirm, second-guess, or reject the 
executive’s policy balance.  It is the courts’ job to make sure that constitutional principles 
of eight centuries’ standing, like habeas corpus, find their proper way into that balance. 
 
The Boumediene majority found the relevant federal statute unconstitutional because, 
inter alia, it did not provide for proper judicial review of the most fundamental factual 
issue facing the Guantánamo prisoners: whether they are indeed “enemy combatants.” 
This was the issue that the Eisentrager Court (under vastly different circumstances) had 
in part presumed.  The dissenters would have upheld the statute not because it met 
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  See Boumediene, 2008 LEXIS 4887 at *178-185. 
42
  For the first sentence of this section, Justice Scalia wrote, “America is at war with radical 
Islamists.”  Id. at *178.  See also, id. (“The game of bait-and-switch that today’s opinion plays 
upon the Nation’s Commander in Chief will make the war harder on us.  It will almost certainly 
cause more Americans to be killed”); id. at *184-185 (“What competence does the Court have to 
second-guess the judgment of Congress and the President on such a point [that habeas 
proceedings would compromise the military mission at Guantánamo]?  None whatever.  But the 
Court blunders in nonetheless”). 
43
 See id. at *179-181.  For a critique of Roberts’ logic, see n.33 supra. 
minimum constitutional requirements, which they were unwilling to define, but because, 
they said, it provided aliens more procedural rights than ever before.44 
 
The logic of this points escapes me even now. If the current situation is unique, then what 
relevance does this fact have?  More to the point, if the issue is whether the prisoners 
were in fact “prisoners of war,” which in the past always meant enemy soldiers of nations 
at war with the United States, what relevance does it have to a different issue: the 
prisoners’ claims of non-affiliation with an historically unique non-state, transnational 
organization of terrorists? 
 
The dissenters’ own prose condemned them as judicial activists.  Although they accused 
the majority as such,45 it was they who devoted substantial parts of their dissents to 
policy.  The majority wrote nary a word about policy, except to reaffirm the executive’s 
control over it and the executive’s broad discretion to set it. 46 The majority devoted its 
opinion entirely to relevant history and law. 
 
Had the dissenters’ prevailed, the effect of their view would have been to enhance the 
power of the executive and weaken the Great Writ which, for nearly 800 years, has 
helped hold executive abuses in check.  Their view would have granted our executive, in 
our name, the power of a tyrant over aliens apprehended and detained abroad.  Yet the 
notion that absolute power doesn’t matter when it affects only aliens abroad is patently 
false.  It affects our international moral standing and how foreigners see us.  More to the 
point, it can engender foreign angst, resistance, enmity, hatred and retaliation. 
 
Evidence of this point arose just a week or so ago, half a world away, in South Korea.  
South Korean President Lee Myung Bak was once an immensely popular mayor of Seoul.  
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 See id. at *163 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The [statute] provides more opportunity and more 
process, in fact, than that afforded prisoners of war or any other alleged enemy combatants in 
history”).  All four dissenters wrote or joined both dissents.  See n.24 supra. 
45
  See id. at 142 (Roberts, C.J.) (gently implying that majority’s failure to wait for statutory 
remedies to be exhausted was judicial activism); id. at *203 (Scalia, J., dissenting: “[w]hat drives 
today’s decision is neither the meaning of the Suspension Clause, nor the principles of our 
precedents, but rather an inflated notion of judicial supremacy”). 
46
  See id. at *126-127 (majority opinion; citation omitted): 
“In considering both the procedural and substantive standards used to impose 
detention to prevent acts of terrorism, proper deference must be accorded to the 
political branches. . . .  Unlike the President and some designated Members of 
Congress, neither the Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the 
day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation and 
its people.  The law must accord the [*127] Executive substantial authority to 
apprehend and detain those who pose a real danger to our security.” 
Yet he became the object of the biggest and most passionate mass demonstrations in 
South Korean history, which may yet cause his government to fall.47 
 
The immediate trigger for the popular unrest was Lee’s decision to allow American beef 
back into Korea, despite Koreans’ fear of mad cow disease.  Yet many observers think 
the real reason for the popular uprising was Koreans’ dislike of what they perceive as 
Lee’s high-handedness.  He made the decision to import the beef before entering trade 
discussions with our president, thereby giving up his only leverage and making what 
(from the South Korean perspective) was a blunder in bargaining.  In the process, he 
treated our president as a loyal vassal treats a feudal lord.  Lee’s own high-handedness, 
plus his kowtowing to what is universally perceived abroad as our president’s own, 
provoked the outrage.  It was a case of popular reaction to international executive hubris 
on two continents, in a nation that is virtually a protectorate of ours. 
 
Ironically, the Korean people could recognize executive high-handedness while four 
members of our highest Court did not. In establishing Guantánamo as a presumed 
“Constitution-free” zone, our executive did not ask the appropriate question.  It did not 
enquire “how can we protect the American people consistently with our fundamental 
laws, our near millennial Anglo-American history, and our constitutional values?”  
Instead it asked, “how can we operate with minimal interference by the Constitution and 
the courts?”  It purpose and effect, the executive’s approach was a power grab in the 
name of security from terror. 
 
Fortunately, five members of the Court recognized it as such and acted accordingly.  
They reaffirmed habeas and the Court as the constitutional checks on high-handed 
executive power that they are both supposed to be.  Yet their decision was mild and non-
intrusive.  All they upheld was courts’ right—after the fact—to determine the legality of 
detaining persons held in the so-called “war on terror.”  They did so under a flexible, 
practical standard which gives ample room for the exigencies of war and intelligence, 
including exigencies that brook no delay.48  Had the Court refused to take this mild 
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 See Choe Sang-Hun, “Shaken Korean Leader Promises New Beginning,” New York Times 
(June 12, 2008), available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/world/asia/12skorea.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=lee%20myung
%20bak&st=cse&oref=slogin (visited June 12, 2008); Choe Sang-Hun, “Seoul protest threatens 
to topple government,” International Herald Tribune (June 10, 2008), available at 
http://iht.nytimes.com/articles/2008/06/10/asia/korea.php?scp=5&sq=lee%20myung%20bak&st
=cse (visited June 16, 2008). 
48
  See id. at *121-122 (majority opinion; citations omitted): 
“In cases involving foreign citizens detained abroad by the Executive, it likely 
would be both an impractical and unprecedented extension of judicial power to 
assume that habeas corpus would be available at the moment the prisoner is 
taken into custody.  If and when habeas corpus jurisdiction applies, as it does 
in these cases, then proper deference can be accorded to reasonable procedures 
measure to uphold the rule of law against executive high-handedness, it would have 
countenanced yet another step from democracy toward empire. 
 
The majority deserves credit not only for the result, but for the pedagogic value of its 
opinion.  Although perhaps too long,49 the opinion amply demonstrated just how strongly 
nearly eight centuries of Anglo-American history support its conclusion, and just how 
vapid and unhelpful resort to “original intent” and inapplicable precedent can be.  Unlike 
the Hamdan plurality, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Boumediene Court, did not miss 
this “teachable moment.” 
 
So the Court is back.  It has reassumed its role as a coequal branch of government, able 
and willing to keep the Executive within proper bounds.  And it has returned to writing 
opinions that instruct the nation and the world on the rich and admirable history of 
Anglo-American rights and the rule of law. 
 
If there is one dark cloud in this picture, it is that the Court’s return to active duty hung 
on a single vote.  That fact shows just how important the coming presidential election 
will be, not just to arrest the slide of workers’ and abortion rights, but also to stem the 
much more terrifying prospect of descent into empire. 
                                                                                                                                                  
for screening and initial detention under lawful and proper conditions of 
confinement and treatment for a reasonable period of time.  Domestic 
exigencies, furthermore, might also impose such onerous burdens on the 
Government that here, too, the Judicial Branch would be required to devise 
sensible rules for staying habeas corpus proceedings until the Government  
[*122] can comply with its requirements in a responsible way.” 
49
 The majority opinion runs some 21,885 words.  At that length, it is nearly three times as long 
as our entire Constitution—including obsolete language, the Bill of Rights and other 
amendments—which runs 7,503. 
